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Abstract
Recent development in quantum computation and quantum infor-
mation theory allows to extend the scope of game theory for the quan-
tum world. The paper is devoted to the analysis of interference of
quantum strategies in quantum market games.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recent development in quantum computation and quantum information the-
ory allows to extend the scope of game theory for the quantum world [1, 2].
In the ”standard” quantum game theory one tries in some sense to quan-
tize an operational description of the ”classical” game in question. Iqbal
and Toor have successfully applied the method of quantization of games
1proposed by Marinatto and Weber [3] in biology [4, 5, 6] and recently they
have used the same formalism to analyse the Stackelberg duopoly (leader-
follower model) [7]. In the classical setting of the duopoly game the follower
becomes worse-oﬀ compared to the leader who becomes better-oﬀ. But
they have shown that in the quantum version the follower is not hurt even
if he or she knows the action of the leader. The backward induction out-
come is the same as the Nash equilibrium in the classical Cournot game
(that is when decisions are made simultaneously and there is no information
hurting players). Two of the present authors have managed to formulate
a new approach to quantum game theory that is suitable for description
of market transactions in terms of supply and demand curves [8]-[11]. In
this approach quantum strategies are vectors in some Hilbert space and
can be interpreted as superpositions of trading decisions. For a trader they
form the ”quantum board”. The actual subject of investigation may con-
sist of single traders, teams of traders or even the whole market. Not the
apparatus nor installation for actual playing but strategies are at the very
core of the theory. Spontaneous or institutionalized market transactions
are described in terms of projective operations acting on Hilbert spaces of
traders’ strategies. Quantum entanglement is necessary to strike the balance
of trade. The discussed below text-book examples of departures from the
demand and supply law are related to the negative probabilities that often
emerge in quantum theories and form very interesting illustrations of them
[9, 10]. This model predicts the property of undividity of the traders’ atten-
tion (no clonning theorem). The theory uniﬁes also the English auction with
the Vickrey’s one attenuating the motivation properties of the latter. There
are analogies with quantum thermodynamics that allow to interpret market
equilibrium as a state with vanishing ﬁnancial risk ﬂow. Sometimes eupho-
ria, panic or the herd instinct cause violent changes of market prices. Such
phenomena can be described by the non-commutative quantum mechan-
ics [8, 10]. There is a simple tactic that maximize the trader’s proﬁt on an
eﬀective market: accept proﬁts equal or greater then the one you have
formerly achieved on average.H e r ew ew o u l dl i k et oa n a l y s et h ec o n s e -
quences of interference of quantum strategies. We begin with the analysis
of tactics changing the demand. Then we discuss the supply-side aspects.
Both sides’ strategies are related by the Fourier transform.
22 Tactics changing demand















i (supply representation) where
q and
p are logarithms of
prices at which the player is buying or selling, respectively [8, 11, 12]. We
have deﬁned canonically conjugate hermitian operators of demand
Q and
supply
P corresponding to the variables
q and
p characterizing strategy of
the player. This led us to the deﬁnition of the observable that we call the









































































￿ is, roughly speaking, an aver-
age time spread between two opposite moves of a player (e.g. buying and
selling the same commodity) [12]. The parameter
m
>
0 measures the risk
asymmetry between buying and selling positions. Analogies with quantum
harmonic oscillator are not accidental and one can even deﬁne a parame-
ter
h
E that describes the minimal inclination of the player to risk [8]. The
distribution functions, that is integrals of squared absolute values of the am-
plitudes, have natural interpretation in terms of demand and supply curves
[10, 11]. This picture should be supplemented with dynamics resulting from
the traders’ tactical moves. Tactical moves of traders, that modify their be-











2. The fundamental tactic that switches the
supply strategy into the demand one and vice versa is described by the
Fourier transform. There are also tactics that only modify the demand or
supply strategy without switching sides. We are interested in such tactics
that the resulting strategy is a pure state and therefore cannot be reduced to
a convex combination of strategies that is to the components having deﬁnite
supply or demand characteristics. Such combinations are possible only if
components are not orthogonal (that is, they do not correspond to classical
strategies). The possibility of forming such combinations is a pure quan-
tum eﬀect that cannot be described in terms of the classical probabilistic
approach.


















3commutes with the supply operator
P [8, 10] and therefore does not change




















i, so the shape of the supply curve of the
player is unchanged. The quantum formalism enables playing by using
families of tactics of the form (the proper normalization can be achieved




























) are homogeneous complex projective coordinates of points























) correspond to identity mapping of the initial strategy
and its shifted copies, respectively. The remaining points parameterize all
possible superpositions of the initial strategies. We deﬁne the (commuting)































































The transition from a state being a normal (Gaussian) distribution to a
















manipulating coeﬃcients of the superposition or the widths
￿ of Gaussian













) series of tactics which are convergent to them.















the process of changing the demand (and the corresponding supply) with
the eﬀects of the interference of the strategies. They represent behaviours
of the player which diﬀer from the standard one dictated by the law of
demand and supply. The diverse market strategies might be identiﬁed with
the behaviours of the player connected with the price of the particular
goods (which have appeared under diﬀerent states of his (or her) knowledge
or perhaps subconsciousness). Then the superposition of the strategies of
the player could be interpreted as the appearance of the diverse types of
couplings between simultaneous ensembles of diﬀerent states of the player.
Often during the alteration of our opinions and characteristic behaviours,
the old and new stages of our changing individuality coexist with each other
in a variety of relations. With the lack of such coexistence, ”schizophrenic”
states might lead to the behaviors which are socially ineﬃcient.











We are interested in quantum description of a game which consists in buy-
ing or selling of market goods. We will investigate the pure adiabatic strate-
gies only. Such a restriction is justiﬁed by the fact that in the market reality
the inclination to the risk seems to be a characteristic feature of the player
hence for one participant of the market it is unchanged even over big inter-
vals of the time. Therefore the player has at his (her) disposal the Gaussian



















4 as a function of the logarithm of the price,
above which the player give up buying goods oﬀered to him (withdrawal
price [10, 12]). The free choice both of the currency unit and the logarithmic

















1respectively. It is worth to notice that the
Gaussian strategy is, in the quantum setting, the only one which fulﬁlls the
law of the demand and supply.


















g. To abbreviate the notation we use the inhomogeneous coor-















), the Gaussian strategy is replaced with the superposition of

























In the following Figures we will compare the player’s demand given by























































which would appear in the classical theory (in which the interference eﬀects








0 ,w eo b s e r v et h e
biggest overlapping of two Gaussian curves, which in addition are submit-














),f o rw h i c h











5In order to demonstrate the scale of the quantum eﬀects, the correspond-
ing sum of two Gaussian strategies which does not have the interference
ingredient
(1
) is drawn in Figure 1 and the following ones as the dashed
line.






Figure 1: Constructive interference of two Gaussian strategies which are
























￿. It is represented in Figure 2.N o w ,
after the change of the phase of the
z parameter only, the bell like curves
which have their origin in the superposition of the Gaussian curves are
fully separated. The interference is also the cause of their mutual repul-
sion. The smaller the gap between the Gaussian components the stronger
the inﬂuence of the interference is. Figure 3 represents the case with the













2). Yet, the destructive interference enhances these features
that discriminate between the curves.
The integral curves of the distribution of the probability densities given
in Figure 3 (hence the cumulative probability, but with the inverted domain)
are represented in Figure 4. In agreement with the previously given market
interpretation of the quantum theory [9]-[11] they describe the inﬂuence
of the quantum (interference) eﬀects onto the shape of the demand curve









































We have analyzed the demand following from the strategy which in the
demand representation is a superposition of the Gaussian strategies. The
description of the strategies in terms of squared modules of the probability
amplitudes (as it is in the classical picture) and not the amplitudes them-
selves is incomplete. Hence it is interesting to complete it by the description
of the very strategy in the relation to its supply aspect. The quantum de-
scription of the market presented in this paper requires to perceive a player









i acquires a speciﬁc commodity and consuming it (pro-
cessing or leaving unchanged) gains a proﬁt described by the operator
Q
+
P. It is this observable, and not
Q alone, which does not depend on
the choice of the monetary unit and measures the price of the commod-
ity in the transaction. The density of the probability of the supply random
variable






i of the same strategy
j
 















i, expresses therefore the full relation of the player with the market.





Figure 3: The destructive interference ”pushing aside” two of the overlap-
























The independent treatment of supply and demand aspects of behaviours
appearing on the market is not in agreement with the quantum description.






not commute with the Fourier transformation hence it is not indiﬀerent
in which representation, the supply or demand one, the player performs
the superposition of the strategies. The supply probability density for the
strategies which are the demand superposition of the Gaussian strategies







are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6.
In the case of a player acting as a commercial agent, the derivative of
the cumulative probability could be interpreted as the intensity of the sale
signal which is sent by the player to the market when he is going to sell a
goods purchased beforehand2.
We notice that manipulating with the phase allows for a wide choice of














0has the clearly localized sale signal (Figure 5),
2Market games diﬀer a little depending on whether the player announces the will of
buying or accepts the price of goods.






F i g u r e4 :T h ec h a n g eo ft h ed e m a n dc u r v ec a u s e db yt h eq u a n t u mi n t e r -
ference eﬀect presented in Figure 3.



















￿ (Figure 5) we have that with the falling of the price3,t h eb u y
signal appears at ﬁrst cautiously, but after a farther decline, it reappears
for the second time as a stronger one.










￿ (Figure 6). Let us notice that
just only the measurement of the random variable











5 The conditional demand
An interesting thing is the examination of variety of aspects of the strategies









pseudo-probability density function can be calculated with the following
formula
3The variable
p has been chosen so that it diminishes with the increase of the unit
price of goods.














































































































￿ is the dimensionless economics counterpart of the Planck con-













Note that the asymmetric crater-like hollow in the diagram has the min-
imum bellow zero, the fact which qualitatively distinguishes the Wigner
function from the supply and demand distributions for models formulated
in the realm of the classical probability theory in which the measure of
the probability has to be nonnegative. The intersection of the surface of
the diagram with the surface given by
p
=constant depicts the conditional
probability density which is the measure of the probability for the with-
drawal price of the player in the situations when this price is constant
during the act of selling. The cross sections for the negative values of the
Wigner function are characteristic for the situation of the giﬀen-strategy.
The suitable integrals for these curves represent fully rational situations

















) (the dashed line).
for which the demand (or supply) cease to be a monotonous function. The
example of such a reaction of the player (it might be the rest of the world)
is illustrated in Figure 8. We observe here the lack of the property of the
monotonicity for the demand (or supply) curves (Giﬀen paradox). In this
context it is worthy to raise the question whether the legendary captain
Giﬀen, after observing a market anomaly which is contradictory to the law
of demand, has recorded the surprising (although having an explanation)
demand that decreases after the fall of the price, or simply noticed the
destructive interference which had been the eﬀect of a careful demand
transformation characteristic for a intelligent (hence acting rationally) but
poor consumer. The authors incline towards the second answer. It has the
superiority because of its ability to be falsiﬁed [13] which is a consequence
of the precision qualitative predictions for this phenomenon made by the
quantum theory. The case of the non-monotonous conditional demand for
interfering Gaussian strategies has been characterized before. We recall
that this characteristic is the proper one for all non-Gaussian strategies.
Therefore it seems important to look after the conditions of the market
game under which the strategies described by the normal distributions do
not lead to the maximalization of value of the intensity of the gain. They
might explain the circumstances in which we met the giﬀen-strategies.























The careful reader has certainly noticed other, besides the non-monotonicity,
characteristic of the integral curves for some cross sections of the diagrams







x (eg, for the surface in Figure 7 with the oppo-
site orientation of the axis
p). It means that there exists a nonzero price








￿ under which the player irreversibly losses his
interest in its buying. For example in the capricious world of the fashion
business such a kind of market behaviours are frequently noticed; they are
also known by the owners of the rubbish auction. The example of a condi-
tional demand curve is presented in Figure 9. When, under the condition
of unchanging tactic player’s estimation of the usefulness of the goods has
diminished properly, and afterwards the value of the parameter
p has been
changed, then the new cross section shall be free from this anomaly.
Both of the just discussed phenomena of the departures from the law
of demand and supply (and also others paradoxical properties) disappear
if only the cross sections are integrated over
p. The thus obtained joint
cumulative probability of demand, being the integral of the square of the

















) (The integral curve for the intersection of the surface from
















i, fulﬁlls the orthodox form of the law.
The above considerations have proved that the superposition of the el-
ementary quantum strategies has peculiarities which are well known from
the observations of markets. The modeling of these behaviours in the realm
of the traditional probability theory would be impossible for the same rea-
son that made the physicists to reject the classical picture of the world. In
this context it seems obvious that eg the designers of the software, which
automatically invests on capital markets, sooner or later will be confronted
with the need of using models of quantum market games. Hence it is wor-
thy to make a few comments on the unique eﬃcacy which is characteristic
for the quantum tactics.
6 Self-consistent nonlinear tactics





) operating on the Dirac strategy which




Due to the unique property which is connected with the ﬁxed point theorem
[12] it appears to be the method of the maximization of the gain in the market






Figure 9: The non-monotonous conditional demand with the maximum


























game, in which the rest of the world, being in a polarization compelling to
the exhibition of the oﬀers of prices, accepts the passive tactic
I on its own









) hence it can not be used in a single game. Yet, in the sequence of
identical games, when a partner behaves in a passive manner, we are











) understood in this way is then the unitary one, and being
the quantum operation guarantees to us the conditions required for being
conﬁdential. The just mentioned ﬁxed point theorem assumes that measure
of the probability given by the opponent’s tactic is positive deﬁnite. It is
possible that if an obligatory passive opponent (e.g. the rest of the world is
not able to react to the inconvenient behaviour of only one small participant






quality of the most beneﬁcial one. The infancy of quantum computers do not
hinder us from simulating the scenarios of quantum games on the traditional
computers. In such situations the use of the simplest quantum tactics which
are similar to the ones presented here should bring the completely new
14qualitative eﬀects. These tactics are more rich than the hardly similar to the
alive human market behaviour present algorithms for automatic investment.
Even today the quantum strategies might be used on capital markets if only
funds are raised to be managed in the quantum manner. Also nothing is
opposing to the possibility that new markets appear, on which all parties of
transactions might be using quantum tactics. The physical quantum models
oﬀer the solutions which are extremely stable in comparison with their
classical counterparts [14]. So, perhaps the quantum markets would protect
the future society from negative consequences of the deep oscillations of
the prices which are characteristic for nowadays economy.
For the needs of the time, when the principles of the functioning of the
market allow to analyze behaviors of partners of transactions, the game,
which is played with an opponent whose tactic is reacting to our changes
of the strategy, should be examined. Such games posses the thermody-
namic analogies and allows to describe processes of reaching the market
equilibrium. Because of the extension of the subject, the analysis of the
competitive market tactics exceeds the limits of this paper which sketches
only the theme of the quantum market games.
7C o n c l u s i o n s

















i)h ec a n
make changes in a continuous way, is limited to the one dimensional set of








i.I nc o m p a r i s o n
to this, the quantum theory oﬀers him extremely reach possibilities. He
or she faces a choice of a one from many optional continuous curves for
many of the paths connecting the poles of the sphere
S
2. Therefore such
a ”quantum player” puts the qualitatively new challenges to an opponent.
The opponent who has at his disposal the knowledge based on the classical
game theory only, often is doomed from the start.
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